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1. ITRODUCTIO 
Today, more than ever, there is a need for effective aid. We have an obligation to the world's 
poor to make the most of every cent spent on development. That obligation is particularly 
pressing in times like these, when multiple crises are hitting the globe. We also have an 
obligation to our own citizens, the taxpayers, to ensure that their money is accountable and 
used transparently. When society demands efficiency and effectiveness in all other matters of 
economy and finance, how could development cooperation remain on the sideline? 
After the Third High Level Forum on Aid Effectiveness, held in Accra, Ghana, in September 
2008, which built on the commitments made at the First and Second High Level Forums in 
Rome (2003) and Paris (2005) respectively, the international agenda for improving aid 
effectiveness is in place. What is needed now is determined implementation. 
Implementation is a formidable task. Today the aid effectiveness agenda is wider and more 
challenging than ever before: following the adoption of the Accra Agenda for Action (AAA)
1
 
there are now, in addition to the 12 indicators agreed to in the Paris Declaration
2
, 48 new or 
strengthened commitments for the development community as a whole of which 34 for the 
donors to implement. The EU has four additional targets from 2005, confirmed in the 
European Consensus
3
 and now partly reflected in the AAA. The Accra High Level Forum 
deepened the international aid effectiveness agenda. It brought together 130 countries, 40 
international organisations, over 80 civil society organisations and representatives from the 
private sector and academia. In Accra, the developing countries exerted much more influence 
in the process than in the previous forums. A number of new issues, such as South-South 
cooperation, the role of civil society organisations and situations of fragility now form part of 
the agenda and must be dealt with.  
The 2008 Survey on Monitoring the Paris Declaration
4
 showed that progress has been made, 
but too little and too slow. Efforts need to be stepped up dramatically if we are to achieve the 
Paris targets, and the four additional EU ones, in 2010, just one year away. Responsibilities, 
however, go beyond meeting the Paris targets. Development cooperation is starting to be in its 
late middle age, in its respectable 50s. It is time to show that the world is learning from past 
experience, from successes and mistakes. It is high time to prove that the development 
community and the EU can reform. 
This paper cannot and does not aim to cover the whole aid effectiveness agenda. Neither is the 
aim to duplicate the Paris Survey. It focuses on the four key areas to which the EU committed 
itself in the Council conclusions of May 2008 and in the EU Guidelines for Accra: division of 
labour, use of country systems, predictability of aid and mutual accountability for results, 
including less conditionality. 
                                                 
1
 http://siteresources.worldbank.org/ACCRAEXT/Resources/4700790-1217425866038/AAA-4-
SEPTEMBER-FINAL-16h00.pdf 
2
 http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/11/41/34428351.pdf 
3
 Joint Statement by the Council and the representatives of the Governments of the Member States meeting 
within the Council, the European Parliament and the Commission on European Union Development 
Policy:  "The European Consensus"; Brussels 22 November 2005; OJ C 46, 24.2.2006); paragraph 32 
4
 http://www.oecd.org/dac/effectiveness/monitoring/survey (Survey in 54 developing countries covering 
year 2007) 
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The question addressed in this paper is: how well is the EU implementing the Paris and Accra 
commitments? The responses to the Commission's recent questionnaire "From Monterrey to 
Doha- EU Progress on Financing for Development"
5
, which included a section on aid 
effectiveness, shed some light on this question and are an opportunity to take stock and re-
engage. 
Monitoring the Paris Declaration: EU status on some of the key targets
6
 
Paris Indicators EU (Member 
States and EC) 
EC 2010 Target 
3. Aid flows are recorded in countries' 
budgets 
44% 57% 85% 
4. Technical assistance is aligned and 
coordinated 
53% 43% 100% (EU target; Paris 
target is 50%)) 
5a. Donors use Country Systems for public 
financial management 
47% 35% 50-80 (EU and now 
Accra global target is 
50%, targets for each 
individual partner 
country depends on 
performance) 
5b. Donors use country procurement systems 54% 34% 50-80 (EU and now 
Accra global target is 
50%, targets for each 
individual partner 
country depends on 
performance) 
6a. Donors reduce stock of parallel PIUs with 
two-third 
780 
(Per Member 
State: 56) 
 
203 
Indicative EU: 118 
Indicative EC: 68 
7. Aid is more predictable 43% 53% 71% 
8. Aid is untied 94% .A. Indicative: 100% 
9. Donors use coordinated mechanisms for 
aid delivery (through programme-based 
approaches) 
46% 44% 66% 
10a. Donors coordinate their missions 33% 33% 66% (EU target; Paris 
target is 40%) 
10b. Donors coordinate their 
(country)studies and analytical work 
62% 72% 66%  
                                                 
5
 http://ec.europa.eu/development/icenter/repository/EU-progress-on-financing-for-development-and-
MDGsQuestionnaire11-12-2008.pdf 
6
 Aggregate data from the 14 Member States (Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, 
Ireland, Italy, Luxemburg, The Netherlands, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, The United Kingdom) and the 
Commission, that participated in the Paris survey; based on the Survey on Monitoring the Paris 
Declaration 2008  
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Explanatory note on the table: It should be noted that concerning indicator 4 and 10a the EU set itself 
more ambitious targets than the global target. The same applies to the use of country systems, but with the 
Accra Agenda for Action the EU target of 50 % has been adopted internationally. In the table the average 
performance of the EU (Member States and the European Commission together) is compared to the 
performance of the European Commission only. On alignment the European Commission is stronger than 
the EU average with regard to aid predictability, while the EU on average shows stronger performance on 
the use of country systems, including alignment of technical assistance and the relatively restricted use of 
parallel Project Implementation Units. On harmonisation the EU average and the European Commission 
are at equal with respect to use of programme based approaches and coordination of in-country missions, 
while the European Commission is more advanced in coordinating studies and analytical work. 
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2. REDUCIG FRAGMETATIO OF AID: DIVISIO OF LABOUR 
The EU Guidelines for the Third High Level Forum on Aid Effectiveness state that donors 
should apply division of labour by "reducing the number of sectors where they are active" and 
by "reviewing their own aid procedures which hinder in-country division of labour 
processes"
7
. In the AAA the development community agreed to a set of measures to reduce 
the costly fragmentation of aid. The EU has promoted division of labour especially by 
adopting the EU Code of Conduct on Complementarity and Division of labour
8
. The Fast 
Track Initiative (FTI, see information box), co-led by Germany and the Commission, was set 
up to speed up division of labour by facilitating the process at the country level. The FTI 
operates in tandem with the Commission's initiative on delegated cooperation (see 
information box). An EU Toolkit has also been developed to support the process on the 
ground. 
"Ownership of aid and division of labour", Bamako, Mali 20 ovember 2008 
At the initiative of France, a high-level meeting was organised between donors and the government of 
Mali to discuss how to concretely promote aid effectiveness and division of labour. The government took 
leadership of the event and was represented through several ministries. The government emphasised the 
need for the donors to align themselves to the country's budgetary processes and policies and also to the 
need for donors to have a harmonised approach. The donors agreed to coordinate their approaches within 
a joint assistance strategy (the "Stratégie Commune d'Assistance Pays- SCAP") and assured that division 
of labour will not lead to less funding. 
2.1. In-country division of labour 
The responses to the Monterrey survey show that EU donors are taking division of labour 
seriously. When it comes to sector concentration, at least five EU donors have translated the 
commitment of the EU Code of Conduct to reduce the sectors of involvement into their 
bilateral development policy documents. Almost all use the concept of comparative advantage 
as a guiding criteria, though often linked to historical presence on the ground and not 
necessarily to an analysis of current strengths and weaknesses as a donor. One Member State 
indicated that sector concentration is difficult precisely because of historical ties and 
expectations for continued multi-sectoral engagement. 
Almost all Member States (20) are interested in engaging in joint donor responses and looking 
for more complementarity and division of labour, whether in the framework of their 
multiannual programming by withdrawing from or entering into a sector or entering into 
delegated cooperation arrangements. For two this is already standard policy. The interest in 
joint responses concentrates naturally on existing priority countries. 
Five Member States however are not yet ready for division of labour. The reasons given are 
capacity constraints or prohibitive current policies and/or legislation.  
Most Member States report that they already concentrate their aid in three sectors or less, 
although six indicated concentration on more than three sectors in most of the countries they 
                                                 
7
 Third High Level Forum on Aid Effectiveness (HLF-III)-Accra, Ghana, 2-4 September 2008. Guidelines 
for the participation of the European Union, 11 July 2008 
8
 Council Conclusions on the EU Code of Conduct on Complementarity and Division of labour in 
Development Policy, 15 May 2007 (9558/07);   
http://register.consilium.europa.eu/pdf/en/07/st09/st09558.en07.pdf 
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were involved in. Smaller donors have a natural tendency to focus on fewer sectors than those 
with high aid volumes.  
According to the answers to the questionnaire there are more than three times as many 
developing countries where EU-donors practise intensive sector concentration than there are 
with a wide range of sectors. A quick comparison with the EU Donor Atlas 2008
9
 however 
suggests that there may be a positive bias in the questionnaire findings perhaps owing to lack 
of clarity on sector definition (OECD/DAC definition, the donors own definition or partner 
countries' definitions). 
For the Commission, the Guidelines for Country Programming call for more concentration, 
division of labour and complementarity
10
. Following the sector definitions laid down in the 
European Consensus, the current average for country programmes stands at 2.9 sectors in 
Latin America, 3.3 in Asia, 5.6. in ACP and 6.2 in the Neighbourhood countries. Generally 
speaking, while activities in Latin America and Asia fulfil the concentration requirement, 
assistance in ACP countries is less concentrated, in particular in post conflict/fragile situations 
in order to respond to the needs in the context of "Linking Relief Rehabilitation and 
Development". In the case of the pre-accession candidates and potential candidates and the 
countries covered by the European Neighbourhood Policy, assistance is often driven by 
acquis-related rather than development considerations. The ensuing broader political 
framework may call for a more multi-sectoral approach with less sector concentration. 
As regards delegated cooperation, one modality for division of labour, the majority of 
Member States (18) are managing or preparing to manage funds from each other or the 
Commission, or vice versa. Findings on the Fast Track Initiative (see also information box) 
indicated that several donors still had impediments in their rules and procedures to use this 
modality. Seven Member States were not involved in these exercises, but two were in the 
process of changing their legislation in order to make delegated cooperation possible. 
The Commission's initiative on delegated cooperation 
In May 2008, the Commission identified a number of countries and sectors with potential for delegated 
cooperation. These concerned country programs under the 10
th
 EDF 2008-2013 and the Budget 2007-2013. 
This initiative acts in tandem with other donor processes at the country level for fast tracking division of 
labour. The combined efforts have so far led to a total of around 51 proposals
11
: (i) 37 for delegation by 
the Commission to a Member State in a sector, for a value of around €162 million, (ii) 14 concrete 
proposals for delegation from a Member State to the Commission for a total value of around €90 million . 
For example: in Bangladesh the Commission is planning to delegate €2.3 million to Germany for a project 
on labour law. In Sierra Leone the Commission is preparing to delegate €6 million to the UK for civil 
society capacity building. In Haiti, France is planning to delegate to the Commission the implementation 
of a road project. 
The current financial rules and regulations covering delegated cooperation make delegation 
possible from a Member State to the Commission and vice versa
12
. Delegation from the 
Commission to a Member State requires the Member State financial systems to be audited by 
the Commission to test their capability to manage EC/EDF funds. Six Member States or their 
                                                 
9
 http://development.donoratlas.eu/ 
10
 Communication from the Commission to the Council and the European Parliament - Increasing the 
impact of EU aid : a common framework for drafting country strategy papers and joint multiannual 
programming (COM (2006) 88 of 2.3.2006)  
11
 As per 24
th
 March 2009 
12
 Council Regulation (EC) 617/2007 of 14.05.07 on the implementation of the 10
th
 European Fund under 
the ACP-EC Partnership Agreement (OJ L 152, 13.6. 2007) 
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agencies have gone through this audit and six more audits have been or are about to be 
launched
13
. One Member State will request the audit as soon as legal obstacles are removed. 
As part of the joint programming process, most Member States (22) plan to participate in joint 
reviews (annual and mid term reviews of Country Strategy Papers) in their priority partner 
countries. One Member State regarded this as possible and two do not yet participate in joint 
programming. Capacity constraints limit the scope for some EU donors to join on a regular 
basis. Some Member States showed an interest in building on existing joint approaches, such 
as the one in South Africa. 
There is a large interest, as shown above, in the second step of the joint programming process 
–joint donor response, looking at opportunities for more complementarity and division of 
labour. It is important to keep in mind that designing and agreeing on the modalities is not an 
end in itself. The focus should remain on the overall goal of increased aid effectiveness, 
which calls for simplifying and rationalising the way we work. 
As part of the Mid Term Review of country and thematical programmes, which started in 
2009 with the review of the DCI and ENPI and will continue into 2010 with that of the EDF, 
the Commission delegations are encouraged to deepen the joint programming progress in 
order to achieve further division of labour through full concentration and/or delegated 
cooperation. This opportunity for closer cooperation with the Member States and other donors 
must not be missed. 
                                                 
13
 Finalised audits: AFD, GTZ, SONA (Netherlands Antilles), BTC-CTB, ADA, KfW 
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Fast-track initiative on Division of Labour: progress and obstacles 
The Fast Track Initiative seeks to speed up division of labour, with the Commission or a Member State 
playing a facilitating role on the ground in a number of selected countries. On the basis of a brief 
questionnaire sent out in ovember 2008 fifteen facilitators provided responses that show that 
Some progress has been made on: 
- Donor mapping: carried out in 11 of 15 countries 
- Lead donor arrangements: established in 9 countries covering most sectors 
- Assessments of comparative advantage: carried out in 6 countries 
But there are also some obstacles: 
- in many cases, the rather limited leading or active role of the partner country 
- Reluctance of donors to limit their involvement in certain sectors 
- Unclear definitions of "lead", "active" and "silent" donors 
- Lack of information of the overall picture of aid flows per (sub)sector (who does what and where) 
- Legal and administrative barriers on the donor side 
2.2. Cross-country division of labour 
The EU Guidelines for Accra sought to make operational commitments on cross-country 
complementarity, and as a result of a determined effort by the EU, the Third High Level 
Forum decided to launch an international dialogue on division of labour and cross country 
approaches. 
According to the OECD-DAC study on aid fragmentation,
14
 which looked at the situation in 
153 developing countries, 63 partner countries (41 % of the total) are supported by more than 
20 donors. A further 49 partner countries (33 %) are supported by 11-20 donors. On average 
each partner country has 17 donors with a country program. 
The responses to the Monterrey questionnaire show that the number of partner countries to 
which a Member State directs government-to-government ODA varies greatly. Four Member 
States provide no government-to-government ODA
15
, while five Member States provide it to 
70 countries or more
16
, with the highest figure being 132. Because of its mandate the EC is by 
design present in most (144) developing countries. 
The number of priority countries varied between 2 and 57 per Member State, most often there 
were 8-12 priority countries. The number usually correlates closely with ODA-levels, but on 
the whole low-level ODA-donors also have many priority partner countries. 
                                                 
14
 www.oecd.org/dac/scalingup; The scope of donors in this study encompasses 34 donors, 23 bilateral 
OECD-DAC donors (including 15 Member States), the EC and 10 multilateral donors 
15
 CY, MT, PL, SK 
16
 DE, FI, FR, PT, SE 
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The most common priority partner countries for Member States are Mozambique, Vietnam 
(12 Member States named them as priority countries), followed by the Palestinian territories, 
Moldova, Ethiopia, Afghanistan and Tanzania (10) and Uganda, Mali, Zambia, Yemen and 
Ukraine, Angola Georgia and DRC (7-9). Nineteen developing countries are regarded as 
priority countries by two, 23 by one and 39 countries were prioritised by 3-6 Member States. 
The choice of priority country normally stems from donor government policy, in at least one 
case the priority countries are stipulated by law and in another the parliament establishes the 
criteria. 
Estimation of the share of ODA that goes to priority countries can help to measure the success 
of concentration, though obviously the percentage can be high if the number of priority 
countries is also high. The responses to the Monterrey questionnaire showed that for Ireland 
and Belgium nearly all their bilateral aid commitments is allocated to their priority countries, 
while six more Member States estimate the share to be around 80 % or more
17
. Altogether 18 
Member States estimate that more than half of their ODA goes to priority countries, while in 
two cases the percentage was around 45. For many Member States, particularly with small aid 
volumes, the share of bilateral aid was negligible when compared to other means of funding. 
Conscious efforts have been made to concentrate a larger share of ODA to priority partner 
countries (Spain has a target of 85%). 
According to the OECD/DAC study, in 2005-2006 38 partner countries had 25 or more DAC 
and multilateral donors. In 24 of these countries 15 or more donors provided less than 10 % of 
that country's total aid. This shows that there clearly is plenty of room for donors to further 
concentrate their aid. Donors with higher volumes of ODA tend to spread it over a higher 
number of partner countries, while donors with smaller volumes seem to add to fragmentation 
disproportionately to their size. While fully respecting the principles of ownership and partner 
country leadership, the EU should exert its influence to reduce aid fragmentation by stepping 
up division of labour. 
Six Member States have made an overall assessment of their comparative advantage as a 
donor and 13 have made such assessments at country level, in some cases linked to Joint 
Assistance Strategy exercises. Two Member States will soon make an overall assessment and 
one will update its assessment when it renews its overall development strategy. At least two 
Member States regularly update country-level self-assessments. Donor self-assessments 
clearly need to be discussed during the dialogue on cross-country division of labour under the 
aegis of the OECD/DAC Working Party on Aid Effectiveness. 
Several EU donors have been working to reduce their number of priority countries: Belgium 
reduced the number of priority countries in 2003 from 25 to 18, the Czech Republic in 2005 
from 40-50 to 8, Germany in 2001 from approximately 118 to 70 and again in 2007 from 70 
to 57, and Sweden decided in 2007 to limit the number of priority countries to 33. 
Luxembourg has withdrawn from two and is planning to withdraw from a further six 
countries and The Netherlands will be phasing out from seven countries. At least one more 
Member State is considering further concentration. 
These voluntary and independent processes must include tough prioritisation and courageous 
political decisions. Still, they are taking place without an EU-dialogue. There is a need to 
initiate such a dialogue, as called for in the Council Conclusions on the Code of Conduct, in 
                                                 
17
 EE, LV, LT, NL, PL, UK 
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order to work towards a common EU position for the upcoming discussions on international 
division of labour. 
2.3. Impediments to Division of Labour 
In the answers to the questionnaire the EU donors reported several impediments to 
coordinated programmes and multi-donor arrangements. Most issues centred on 
"bureaucracy" and different donor priorities, procedures and programming calendars, as well 
as limited delegation of powers to country-level. The report on the Fast Track Initiative 
revealed reluctance by donors for sector concentration: headquarters sometimes pushed field 
offices to remain or get engaged in "politically attractive" sectors. On a more positive note, 
two Member States reported no major impediments and three regard joint work as standard 
practice. 
Several responses to the questionnaire indicated that coordination was seen as time-
consuming and not at all cost-effective for small-scale interventions. This seems to reveal a 
"donor fatigue": the impression that work on division of labour and complementarity creates 
an additional burden whilst the dividends for partner countries and for donors that should 
logically follow from division of labour are not yet apparent. The multitude of different donor 
coordinating mechanisms at various levels in partner countries, particularly in "donor darling 
countries" show that rationalisation is needed. 
One challenge to division of labour is the lack of overview of what different donors exactly 
are doing in a given country or region. The EU Donor Atlas, launched in 2004, was designed 
and has been further developed to address this issue. Another promising initiative is the EC 
web-based TR-AID (Transparent Aid) system which, with apt data included from different 
donors' systems, can help to show which donors are active in which countries, and for which 
sectors. 
On the other hand some EU-donors, particularly those with smaller aid volumes, are 
concerned about the lack of visibility when entering into delegated cooperation. This is 
especially valid when new aid programmes or agencies are being set up and there is a need to 
boost domestic support for increased ODA. 
Division of labour is particularly important in the context of scaling up of aid. Delivering and 
managing aid has to become less labour intensive. Focus needs to be put on where it belongs: 
on achieving concrete development results. The additional work load caused by the 
preparation process of division of labour is only temporary and should start to pay off very 
quickly by a reduced workload for partner countries and donors alike once division of labour 
is in place. Some specific arrangements, such as joint cooperation including a "traditional" 
donor and a donor with possibly less experience can be used to overcome some of the issues 
concerning volume, visibility and capacity. 
A more serious challenge to the division of labour agenda is probably the perceived 
hesitations of partner countries. In the responses to the questionnaire partner country attitudes 
were described sometimes with terms such as "weak ownership", "suspicion" and 
"reluctance". Partner countries may be apprehensive for a number of reasons: other priorities, 
such as alignment, fear of donors "ganging up" and thus imposition of donor views leading to 
reduction of flexibility and increased conditionality, perceived advantages or disadvantages at 
central and decentralised government levels, such as loss of interface with individual donors, 
the capacity required to lead a division of labour process, and the risk of loss of aid for the 
country or a particular sector. These perceptions are confirmed by observations on the ground, 
such as in the context of the Fast Track Initiative. 
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The EU Code of Conduct is clear on this issue: the first principle states that primary 
leadership and ownership of in-country division of labour should first and foremost lie with 
the partner country government. There is a need to dispel the fear that division of labour will 
be imposed by donors, regardless of partner country opinion. Guarantees need to be given that 
partner countries' areas of development priority will not become underfunded. If partners are 
concerned about "losing" donors, delegated cooperation and silent partnerships can be 
considered instead of complete withdrawal. 
3. STREGTHEIG COUTRY OWERSHIP- USE OF COUTRY SYSTEMS 
The 2008 Paris Declaration Monitoring Report revealed that, although clear progress had been 
made in the quality of developing countries' public financial management systems, there was 
no corresponding increase in donors' use of those systems. In the EU Guidelines for Accra it 
was recognised that "the use of country systems will lead to strengthening those systems and 
this progress should be supported by donors. The choice of aid modalities should reduce 
transaction costs and strengthen country ownership." 
Despite the 2005 Paris and EU commitments on the use of country systems and programme-
based approaches, which were renewed and strengthened in Accra, project aid and technical 
assistance remain by far the most widely used method by EU donors to deliver aid. Six EU-
donors deliver practically all their bilateral ODA through project aid and technical assistance. 
Altogether the share of project aid and technical assistance varies between 16 and 100% of 
bilateral aid. 
Six EU donors
18
 provide a quarter or more of their ODA support through programme-based 
approaches. For three this consists mainly of budget-support. Ireland delivered (in 2007) 42% 
of its aid through programme-based approaches, excluding budget support, for the UK the 
combined percentage for budget support and other programme-based approaches was 38. The 
Netherlands provided 25% of its bilateral aid through budget support (general budget support 
15% and sectoral budget support 10%). As far as the EC is concerned, for non-ACP-countries 
28% of total budget funds will be provided as budget support, whilst for the ACP-countries 
46% indicative amounts of the National Indicative Programmes of the 10
th
 EDF are 
programmed as budget support (30% general budget support and 16 % sector budget support). 
For a number of reasons several EU-donors were unable to give a breakdown of budget 
support by general and sector budget support. For those that could, five donors
19
 reported 
using more general budget support and five
20
 more sector budget support. The reasons for 
preferring the sector approach are its professed suitability for smaller donors and comparative 
advantage resulting from sector-expertise. 
The take up of country public financial or procurement systems was obviously low for donors 
that did not use programme based approaches. The percentages reported in the questionnaire 
were quoted from the OECD/DAC Paris Declaration monitoring survey and many EU-donors 
were unable to answer due to lack of data.  
                                                 
18
 EC, DE, IE, LU, NL,UK 
19
 DE, DK, IT, NL, PT 
20
 AT, BE, ES, FI, IE 
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For the eleven EU-donors that answered, the take up of PFM systems for the government 
sector varied between 0 and 79%, with eight EU-donors
21
 exceeding the 50% EU target and 
AAA benchmark. The use of country procurement systems varied between 0 and 88%, with 
seven EU-donors
22
 above the Paris Declaration 61% target. 
The reasons given why some Member States' use of country systems remains under the 50 % 
target corresponded to the reasons why programme-based approaches were not used. For 
certain donors it is a question of legislation: the arrangements making programme-based 
approaches are simply not in place. Two countries were reviewing their legislation to make 
new methods of delivering aid possible. 
For most EU donors, the situation at country level, the local context, quite naturally guides the 
choice of modalities being used. General budget support is still seen to have the highest 
political risk as a result of potentially poor public financial management, high fiduciary risks 
and insufficient leadership. Few responses looked at the risks under a fragmented project 
approach. 
Technical cooperation because of its very nature is for many donors difficult to reconcile with 
the use of country systems. These issues are however starting to be addressed (see Chapter 10 
on Capacity Development). For some donors, the preference of projects is a question of 
capacity. When a large share of ODA is channelled through NGOs and multilateral 
organisations the ratio of the use of country systems falls. 
Similarly, in situations of fragility the use of country systems is seen as problematic. At the 
same time the international community agrees that the building of resilient and legitimate 
states should be the central objective of external intervention. The newly founded OECD 
International Network on Conflict and Fragility (INCAF) is working on this issue. The 
European Commission is currently, following up on the 2007 Commission Communication 
and Council Conclusion "Towards an EU response to fragile situations", working towards a 
common approach on the use of budget support in situations of fragility with the World Bank, 
the IMF, and the African Development Bank. Efforts to come to a more strategic and coherent 
EU response is also ongoing in six pilot countries. Both exercises will, together with other 
elements, feed into the EU Implementation Plan for fragile situations which the Commission 
will present in the second half of 2009 The Commission services also foresee this year the 
development, in cooperation with the Council Secretariat, of an EU Action Plan on the Nexus 
between Security and Development. The aim of the plan will be to ensure a coherent and 
coordinated response when contributing to the global efforts supporting sustainable 
development and peace. 
More strikingly, however, in certain cases the partner countries themselves were reported to 
favour the use of donors' systems as national systems were perceived as slow and/or 
inefficient. 
Plans to promote programme-based approaches and use of country systems were put in place 
by five Member States. The Commission is applying a strategy on the use of country systems, 
with the aim of reaching the Paris Declaration, Accra and EU commitments. EU donors' 
internal guidance concentrated on training and programming guidelines. One Member State 
has integrated the Paris targets in its own performance frameworks. 
                                                 
21
 DK, ES, FI, FR, IE, NL, SE, UK 
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An important issue concerning aid effectiveness in general and the use of country systems in 
particular is the role of the "control institutions", which some respondents regarded as highly 
conservative when it comes to applying aid effectiveness principles, postulating that these 
principles will weaken the existing control mechanisms. 
It is important to have the institutions that decide, control and audit the use of finances on 
board in the aid effectiveness debate, both in donor and partner countries. The Commission 
and the Member States need to remain actively engaged with national parliaments and the 
European Parliament. At least one Member State holds frequent discussions on aid 
effectiveness with its control institutions. The Commission does the same, also at a very 
practical level: for example the European Court of Auditors increasingly participates in 
Commission-organised training on aid effectiveness. 
It is clear that the use of country systems remains a challenge for EU donors. However, some 
have been able to reconcile risk management and control to a much larger extent with the 
commitments on aid effectiveness. This is yet another clear example where EU donors should 
learn from each others' practices. 
4. CHAGIG THE ATURE OF CODITIOALITY 
An important international discussion on how donors should apply conditionality has been 
going on for the past decade, especially on conditions linked to macroeconomic governance. 
Significant steps to address the proliferation of conditions have been taken by individual 
institutions, but much remains to be done, as indicated by the EU Guidelines for Accra: "The 
EU is convinced that conditionality must be reformed in order to give partner countries the 
necessary sovereignty on their development strategies. Donors and partner countries should 
work together in a partnership. Imposed conditions should be avoided." 
In the answers to the questionnaire practically no EU donor reported having issues with 
conditionality, as only two Member States state that they apply conditions that are not 
mutually agreed with partner countries and based on national development strategies. The 
responses to the questionnaire also suggest that Member States are relatively split on the 
process to reduce the number of conditionalities: five Member States replied that they are 
actively reducing conditionalities, while thirteen were not. 
As recognised in the EU Guidelines for Accra, there are some fundamental principles for each 
development agreement, such as human rights, democracy and rule of law, which should not 
be interpreted as conditions. Environmental sustainability and gender equality are also key 
objectives. Mutually agreed development goals and performance targets are the basis for 
planning, implementation and monitoring of joint efforts as well as for mutual and domestic 
accountability. There are also measures that can be necessary for good governance and 
effective management, such as the lapse of commitments if agreements are not signed, or 
conformity of agreements to international law. To fulfil the commitments made in Accra, it is 
necessary, however, to have a serious look, together with our partner countries, at how 
conditionalities are applied and also how EU donors' internal requirements are applied to 
cooperation with developing countries. Where necessary, the donors' own systems should be 
addressed. 
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Some of the EU donors that provide budget support
23
 use Performance Assessment 
Frameworks (PAF) jointly agreed with partner governments as instruments for monitoring 
and for presenting expected results (conditions) and also as the basis for the policy dialogue 
with the partner country government.  
In Mozambique, for example, the government and the donors have agreed on a multi annual 
Performance Assessment Framework that is based on the targets of the PARPA, the Poverty 
Reduction Strategy of Mozambique. The PAF covers issues such as macro-economics and 
poverty, governance, economic development, human capital and cross cutting issues like HIV, 
gender, rural development and environment. During joint reviews the Government and the 19 
donors that provide general budget support discuss progress against the jointly agreed targets 
(the conditionalities), update targets and confirm disbursements for the next period. This joint 
review links in with similar, more detailed, joint reviews at the sector level. Thus donors and 
partner countries work in partnership and unilaterally set conditions are avoided. 
The Public Expenditure and Financial Accountability (PEFA) Performance Measurement 
Framework, based on a programme jointly financed by the World Bank, the Commission, the 
UK, Switzerland, Norway, France and the IMF has established itself as a successful tool to 
provide a common pool of information for donors and partner countries. PEFA helps deliver a 
common measure and shared understanding of the status of public financial management 
(PFM), greatly facilitating agreement on the appropriate responses thus reducing and 
harmonising PFM conditions at the country level. 
The Public Expenditure and Financial Accountability (PEFA) Performance Measurement Framework 
The PEFA Framework is a standardised tool to assess a country's Public Financial Management (PFM) 
performance with regard to achieving of fiscal discipline, efficient delivery of services and strategic 
allocation of resources. By using a detailed set of high-level performance indicators, the PEFA assessment 
delivers reliable and consistent results giving a systematic method of monitoring progress over time. By 
identifying PFM weaknesses rather than providing concrete reform recommendations it enables countries 
to formulate their own reform strategies, thereby enhancing local ownership and policy alignment. As a 
widely accepted multi-donor approach the PEFA Framework provides for a single diagnostic tool, which 
reduces transaction costs and allows donors' actions being more harmonized. Around 90 countries have 
used the PEFA assessment so far and there have been some repeated assessments. 
The discussion around conditionality, also in responses to the Monterrey questionnaire, 
revolves almost entirely around budget support. The conditions for budget support are at least 
easily identifiable. The application of conditionality in project-based approaches is probably 
more difficult to detect. In any case, the project-approach limits the room of manoeuvre of the 
partner countries to a much larger extent per intervention than programme based approaches. 
Project approaches pose a more serious challenge for harmonisation and require increased 
attention. 
As pointed out by one response to the questionnaire, the application of conditions should be 
clarified in the light of the Paris Declaration and the Accra Agenda for Action. EU donors 
need to make assessments of their own application of conditionalities and to engage 
proactively in the forthcoming international dialogue on good practices in conditionality 
within the OECD/DAC Working Party on Aid Effectiveness. 
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4.1. Making Conditionalities transparent 
The responses to the questionnaire reveal that in several cases conditions are already public, 
and annual reports/reviews and the use of internet are the most common way of informing the 
general public. For some EU donors, the lack of technical capacity poses a challenge to 
widespread publication. In many cases, reports are discussed by national parliaments, a 
practice very much to be encouraged to boost domestic accountability. 
Many EU donors (14) do not yet however make public their conditions, according to the 
replies given to the Monterrey questionnaire. A major reason for this is that conditions- in 
their most easily identifiable sense- are often embedded in financing agreements or policy 
matrices related to general budget support. These agreements are not automatically made 
public; they might even be a priori confidential. Disclosure of the terms of these agreements 
would require the consent of the partner country or partner in question. 
One way of addressing this issue could be to reach a global consent to publicise these 
agreements. A standard clause could be drafted to be inserted in agreements. This way 
transparency would be the norm and an explicit veto would be needed to keep conditions 
secret. 
4.2. Frequency of conditionality reviews 
The survey revealed little overall enthusiasm to move to less frequent reviews of conditions, 
with 13 Member States replying that they do not intend to move in this direction. Most EU 
donors would stick to annual assessments. The main reason given for this is domestic control, 
linked to annual budget cycles. Disbursements are made on an annual basis and eligibility 
criteria are verified before disbursements are made. Only two Member States check 
conditions less often than annually, while two others intend to follow suit. 
Many respondents also referred to the need to have the assessments as an essential part of the 
policy dialogue with partner countries, which also usually follows annual cycles. 
It can be argued that the criteria for disbursements need not themselves be subject to change 
even if the fulfilment of criteria is checked annually. Conditionality is closely linked to 
predictability: financing obviously cannot be predictable if the conditions are subject to 
frequent change. 
5. ICREASIG THE PREDICTABILITY OF AID 
In the EU Guidelines for Accra it was recognised that "greater predictability in aid flow 
programming, commitment and disbursement is needed to support the more effective 
absorption and expenditure of aid. This is urgently needed to facilitate the short-, medium and 
long term planning, budgeting as well as the execution of expenditure by partner countries." 
The EU also called for developing a measurable target to enhance predictability of 
programmable aid flows for a period of a least three years in advance, based on indicative 
forecasts and on a rolling basis. 
Most EU donors either already make multiannual commitments or intend to do so. For many 
Member States, however, domestic legislation or the need to strictly respect annual budget 
cycles still present constraints. Some Member States have either taken or are about to take 
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legislative initiatives in order to allow for multiannual programming. As for the Commission, 
programmable aid is predictable within the timeframe of the Financial Perspectives and the 
European Development Fund. 
Several Member States have moved to multiannual programming through multiannual 
cooperation partnerships with developing countries
24
. Under these partnerships multiannual 
commitments, or at least indicative information on future financing, are now possible. 
Although Member States differ on whether and how much these multiannual commitments 
are subject to annual budgetary processes, EU donors can clearly learn from each others' 
experiences here. 
Commitments of fixed duration remain the norm, both for the Commission and the Member 
States. A number of Member States are, however, making an effort to move to rolling 
forecasts, for example under their forthcoming plans to implement the AAA. 
The "MDG contract" is a new approach being so far implemented under the 10
th
 EDF which 
aims to improve the effectiveness of budget support in accelerating progress towards MDGs 
by increasing its predictability and focusing on results. Perhaps reflecting that the MDG 
Contract is still early in its implementation, most Member States reported that they were still 
considering whether they wished to co-finance or apply the principles of the MDG Contract to 
their own budget support programmes. However, provided some regional differences are 
accounted for, Member States were supportive of an MDG Contract approach being used 
beyond the ACP countries by the European Commission. The Commission continues to 
explore with Member States options for co-financing MDG- Contracts. 
The MDG Contract 
Predictability of aid helps a country more effectively plan and manage its development. This is 
particularly important with respect to the social sectors which are characterised by the high level long 
term recurrent costs. In 2008, recognising the benefits of greater aid predictability, the Commission 
launched a new form of budget support for ACP countries - the MDG Contract. It features a six year 
timeframe and a strong focus on results related to the MDGs. The Commission has finalised proposals for 
MDG-Contracts in 7 countries (Burkina Faso, Ghana, Mali, Mozambique, Rwanda, Uganda, and Zambia) 
and is considering Tanzania. Collectively these account for about €1.8bn, representing 50% of all General 
Budget support. The first MDG Contract was signed with the Government of the Republic of Zambia in 
early March 2009. The UK and Belgium have already indicated an interest in co-financing the MDG 
Contracts. 
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6. MORE VALUE FOR MOEY- UTYIG OF AID 
In general, EU donors are well beyond the DAC-recommendations on untying
25
 aid. Seven 
Member States were able to report that their aid was fully untied, while six have untied their 
ODA to all developing countries. Most EU-donors have no problems with implementing the 
DAC recommendations. Five would be ready to expand the recommendation to other groups 
of developing countries and four to types of development aid not yet covered by the DAC-
recommendations. There is the political will to further untie food aid, but untying technical 
assistance was seen to cause legal and administrative problems. 
Seven Member States have instruments that are voluntarily tied in one way or another. These 
include technical assistance and scholarships as well as concessional loans, mixed grants, debt 
swaps and support to national NGOs. Two Member States are in the progress of untying aid 
further through legislative reforms, either by making new aid modalities possible or by 
renewing laws on concessional loans. 
Almost all Member States procurement rules on bilateral ODA guarantee access to other 
Member States. The few exceptions to this rule include aid tied to developing countries in 
specific programmes. Three Member States' national legislation do not, however, provide 
access and the impact of EC Directives on this was being studied. 
The level of untying of Community aid is based on the regulations of the financing 
instruments. A decision was taken on 24 March to grant access to Australia to EC external aid 
contracts in Asia (except, as yet, in Indonesia). This follows a request by Australia and a 
decision by the Australian government to untie their aid in this region. Untying will therefore 
take place on a reciprocal basis - as foreseen in the Development Cooperation Instrument. 
As concerns the rules on public procurement in the Cotonou Agreement which apply to the 
10
th
 EDF, the European Commission will propose to the ACP-countries the alignment of EDF 
rules to those of the DCI in the context of the revision of the Cotonou Agreement. This would 
be a major step forward in untying aid administered by the Commission. 
The EU remains in the forefront in the debate on untying. It must continue to lead by example 
to get both traditional and emerging donors on board and get the best value out of aid money. 
7. STREGTHEIG COUTRY LEADERSHIP AD MUTUAL ACCOUTABILITY 
Partner country leadership has been a clearly stated guiding principle for the EU. It is 
reflected in EU donor policies and at least two Member States have introduced a reporting 
requirement on how this principle of leadership has been taken into account in their 
cooperation. As a major obstacle, many respondents cited the lack of capacity of partner 
countries to exert leadership. The development policies of partner countries were also often 
regarded as too general to provide guidance and not focused on achieving the MDG's. 
Many EU-donors referred to regular consultative processes and dialogue with partner 
countries, resulting in jointly agreed memoranda, as mechanisms for mutual accountability. 
However, the Paris Declaration Monitoring Survey revealed that only 13 out of the 53 
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surveyed partner countries had functioning mutual accountability mechanisms between 
partner governments and donors. 
There were a few concrete cases of mutual accountability reviews, such as in Mozambique, in 
which many EU-donors participated. PEFA-assessments, which also include indicators on 
donor-behaviour, were also quoted as examples. Germany has set itself a target of being 
involved in at least five country-level mutual accountability assessments by 2011. 
The EU needs to continue to promote mutual accountability both at international and country 
level. One important forum for this is the Working Party on Aid Effectiveness (see 
information box). In its joint comments on the new mandate and structure of the Working 
Party, the EU emphasised the need to safeguard the role of the partner countries, including 
through guaranteeing co-chairmanship positions to partner countries. 
The Working Party on Aid effectiveness 
The Working Party on Aid Effectiveness (WP-EFF), supported by the OECD/DAC secretariat, is the main 
body for international dialogue on Aid Effectiveness. The WP-EFF and its sub-bodies are responsible for 
monitoring the implementation of aid effectiveness and also for preparing the High Level Forums. 
The Working Party is currently being restructured and its mandate is being renewed. The plan is to base 
further work on 4 to 5 thematic clusters. Germany and South Africa have been leading the work on 
forming the cluster "Transparent and Responsible Aid", while The etherlands and Ghana have had the 
lead on the cluster "Country systems". WP-EFF has included DAC-donors, multilateral donors and 
partner countries. The aim of the restructuring is also to ensure that the WP-EFF will be a representative 
body for the whole donor community. This will mean stepping up participation by the partner countries 
and including other actors, such as emerging donors and the civil society. 
8. TRAIIG AD STAFF ICETIVES 
In the Guidelines for Accra, the EU-donors committed themselves to "streamlining processes 
and to encouraging staff to systematically integrate aid effectiveness into their work 
programmes, structures and reporting mechanisms in order to promote the importance of aid 
effectiveness as the way of working for development." 
EU donors provide staff guidance and organise training on aid effectiveness, for example 
training on multiannual programming. There are as of yet few concrete examples on staff 
incentives to promote aid effectiveness. The good practice guidance on incentives for aid 
effectiveness and self-assessment tool presented by the UK and the World Bank to the OECD 
Joint Venture on Managing for Development Results remains the most promising initiative on 
incentives. The UK, The Netherlands and IFAD are piloting the self assessment tool to 
identify existing barriers to aid effectiveness. 
Donor behaviour is apparently to a large extent guided by traditional, rather input-oriented 
incentives, like those related to disbursement levels. There is a need to balance that approach 
with more focus on aid effectiveness and development results. Training and staff incentives 
are clearly areas where the EU could benefit from a closer cooperation and "cross-
fertilisation". 
 EN 20   EN 
9. MAAGIG FOR DEVELOPMET RESULTS 
Before Accra, in the Guidelines, the EU called for "a stronger culture and incentives for 
Managing for Development Results (MfDR)". The answers in the Monterrey questionnaire on 
this subject centred on training and providing staff guidance. In addition, four EU donors have 
recently embarked on strengthening their country offices, four more on reviewing their 
administrative processes and one has gone through an organisational change to increase 
coherence in development cooperation.  
At least five EU-donors
26
 have renewed the methodology or indicators used to monitor aid to 
apply more successfully a results-based approach. In one case this was expected to lead to 
organisational changes. 
The Commission is increasingly putting more focus on development results in its monitoring 
of projects, programmes and overall country programmes, amongst others through the mid-
term review. 
9.1. Measures to strengthen partner countries' data gathering and publishing 
capacity 
In 2004 the second roundtable on Measuring for Development Results agreed on the 
Marrakech Action Plan to improve the availability and quality of statistics to support the goals 
and measure the results of aid. Amongst other tasks this is done by mainstreaming the 
strategic planning of statistical systems and the preparation of national strategies to 
development of statistics (NSDS) for all low-income countries, increasing financing for 
statistical capacity building and urgent improvement in monitoring Millennium Development 
Goals. 
According to the responses to the Monterrey questionnaire, the Paris 21 Consortium, which 
aims to build the systems and capacity of the partner countries to measure their own 
development, remains a main vehicle for EU donors to support the development and 
implementation of statistical strategies in developing countries. The Paris 21 secretariat has 
developed a Partner Report on Support to Statistics, which aims to increase knowledge on 
what development partners are doing to support statistical development; make available this 
information to improve donor harmonisation and collaboration on statistics with the aim of 
ensuring greater coherence at country level and minimising duplication of efforts and to 
increase visibility of statistical support and identify countries or statistical areas where 
additional support is needed. 
One Member State was no longer financing Paris 21 in view of other donors' active 
involvement and is refocusing on bilateral support. A new Statistics for Results Facility, 
housed by the World Bank and working through country partnerships, is supported by the UK 
and the Netherlands. 
One EU donor channels support through a national statistical office, four have projects at 
country level and two integrate statistical capacity building as part of other support 
programmes. For the European Community, Eurostat provides important technical support for 
capacity building. Eurostat's primary focus is on ACP regional organisations, with support at 
national level provided on a case by case basis. Eurostat has prepared a Guide to Statistics in 
                                                 
26
 DE, FR, NL, SE, UK 
 EN 21   EN 
EC Development Co-operation in conjunction with other Commission services in order to 
provide support to delegations and to the EC's external service generally about using statistics 
and identifying and preparing statistics actions. Eurostat is also developing the DISC 
(Database for International Statistical Cooperation) which aims to collect and publish "under 
one roof" summarised details on the statistical projects undertaken by the European 
Commission and ideally also its partners, on the one hand, and, on the other, redistribute and 
publish material on which the statistical capacity of potential partner countries can be 
measured to judge more clearly the potential areas of need and benefits of statistical aid. 
10. CAPACITY DEVELOPMET 
A few EU donors regard most of their support, excluding debt-relief, as capacity building. 
Many EU-donors provide this support through joint work, such as through UNDP, while 
some run only bilateral projects. 
The respondents to the questionnaire recognised non-existing or non-prioritised national 
strategies by partner countries as major obstacles to capacity building. It was also observed 
that there were not enough incentives on the ground to change the behaviour of development 
actors, including the donors and their consultants and advisors, to focus more on capacity 
building. 
The rules applicable to technical cooperation vary from donor to donor much more than the 
rules on programme-based approaches. This works against effective coordination, which leads 
to a fragmented approach, particularly when the donors are under time pressure to deliver 
results. 
The EU Guidelines for Accra stressed that "the donors should assure that their support to 
capacity development of partner countries, including technical cooperation, is needs based 
and/or demand driven and integrated in the national strategies and programs". In July 2008 
the Commission adopted a Backbone Strategy for Reforming Technical Cooperation and 
Project Implementation Units for External Aid"
27
 to provide guidance for a more needs-based, 
harmonised and aligned approach. Member States were involved in preparing the strategy and 
a dialogue on guidelines on technical cooperation ensued. At least one Member State, 
according to the survey, uses the strategy as guidance. The strategy and the continued work on 
the follow-up, including training sessions, could provide a basis for a joint European approach 
on capacity building and technical cooperation. 
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11. GLOBAL IITIATIVES AD VERTICAL FUDS 
Global Vertical Programmes (GVP)
28
 are issue based, multi-country programmes allowing a 
group of development partners to address specific urgent issues of relevance to a wide 
public
29
, representing around 6% of total ODA
30
. While there is no consolidated recording of 
EU funds spent on GVP – as these register as multilateral aid in line with DAC requirements 
– anecdotal information available at EU level shows that some Member States spend up to 
10% of their aid on GVP and the amounts allocated have steadily risen over the last years. 
The increasing importance is shown by the fact that in some countries the Global Fund, for 
example, has become one of the four largest donors, ahead of many bilateral donors. 
Despite the increasing support, the multiplication of GVP schemes in the recent past has 
raised criticism. The European Consensus on Development in 2005 recognised the positive 
aspects of GVP but indicated that "the added value of global initiatives and funds will have to 
be assessed on a case by case basis". More recently, the May 2008 GAERC Council 
Conclusions "call on the Commission and the Member States to consider financing through 
existing financing mechanisms before creating new vertical funds". The Community is 
therefore encouraged to engage in Global Programmes only when GVPs are seen as an 
adequate response to the issue considered, and with due respect for the overarching 
"subsidiarity" principle and the preference given to geographic approaches which facilitate the 
implementation of the aid effectiveness agenda. Finally, in the conclusions of November 
2008, the EU "agreed to work on guidelines on global initiatives and vertical funds to assess 
their added value, and to avoid their proliferation and the increasing transaction costs 
associated." This work must be taken forward in order to tackle the fragmentation of the 
global aid architecture while taking advantage on the emerging good practice in some of the 
vertical funds. 
The Monterrey questionnaire did not produce comprehensive information on the situation at 
EU level, with only four Member States providing analysable information on past trends and 
forecasts. Responding to the European Consensus for Development proposal to "draw up 
criteria for Community participation in global funds and contributions to them" would 
therefore require an active involvement of both the European Commission and Member States 
to gather relevant data and analysis. Figuring out the EU engagement in details and its 
perspective would be a first step toward a harmonised and coordinated approach to supporting 
key global public goods in the future. 
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Education FTI as a "good practice example" of global initiatives promoting country leadership 
The Education for All (EFA) Fast Track Initiative (FTI) is a global partnership to help ensure accelerated 
progress towards the Millennium Development Goal of universal primary education by 2015. The FTI is 
founded on the principle of collective support for a single country-led process towards the development 
and implementation of an Education Sector Plan (ESP). Partner Countries take the lead in designing and 
implementing ESPs through broad-based consultation. The Local Donor Group and Civil Society 
Organisations work together with government to support the development, implementation, monitoring 
and evaluation of the ESP. Donors commit to align and harmonise additional support around the ESP. At 
the same time partner governments are expected to increase domestic expenditure on education. The FTI 
explicitly links increased donor support for primary education to partner countries' policy performance 
and accountability for results. The FTI has recently issued guidelines- FTI Country Level Process Guide- 
to further strengthen the country-led and –based process (available at: http://www.education-fast-
track.org/). 
12. COCLUSIOS 
The EU has a collective obligation to meet the aid effectiveness commitments and targets. 
The overall view emerging from the Monterrey questionnaire exercise is mixed. On the whole 
the responses to the questionnaire are encouraging and show a genuine willingness of EU-
donors to move towards further aid effectiveness. On the other hand, several other monitoring 
exercises have shown that the international and EU commitments will not be met without 
stepping up investments in the aid effectiveness agenda. At present there are too many 
contradictions between aid effectiveness and other priorities. Aid effectiveness should not be 
seen as a residual task but as the core agenda. The EU needs to put aid effectiveness on top of 
its priority list and ensure that all its institutions, political processes, and policies, instruments 
and procedures support aid effectiveness. Work is also needed on the "soft side" of the 
equation to ascertain that the mind sets and behaviour of staff working in headquarters and in 
the field offices are oriented towards aid effectiveness. To address these issues the 
Commission adopted an operational action plan in January 2009 including strategies for use 
of country systems, technical cooperation and implementation arrangements, division of 
labour and outreach to staff in headquarters and delegations. 
Some EU donors are more advanced on aid effectiveness than others. Experience and capacity 
seem to be some of the contributing factors, but each donor has its own strengths and 
weaknesses. Some small volume donors for example coordinate all their donor missions, 
simply because they never initiate missions alone. On the other hand a high volume donor 
acknowledged that its system of cooperation is complex and results in significant internal 
transaction costs. Whilst certain EU donors will more likely face bigger challenges than 
others, it is clear that all EU donors have considerable work to do to achieve the agreed 
international and EU commitments on aid effectiveness. 
Experience or capacity cannot replace the will to act. Neither are lack of experience or 
capacity excuses to renege on our commitments. There is an urgent need to move forward. In 
order to learn, we have to do. Determination is the prerequisite for implementing what is 
already feasible and for addressing impediments to process. 
Some EU donors have sophisticated policies and good practices on aid effectiveness, gathered 
through years of experience. Not all need to go through the same learning cycle, but all need 
to exchange information and learn from each other: take advantage of the successes and avoid 
the mistakes and so leap frog ahead in making EU aid more effective. More joint European 
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efforts are needed to make the fulfilling of individual commitments easier. The responses to 
the questionnaire show several cases where EU donors could learn from each other, such as 
aligning and harmonising technical assistance, promoting programme based approaches and 
use of country systems or moving to multiannual programming and commitments to increase 
predictability. 
The issues touched upon in this report merit further discussion with EU Member States. There 
is a growing need to further identify specific issues which would merit being worked upon 
together, to formulate joint approaches and to promote honest, self-critical donor action plans 
to implement the aid effectiveness commitments. 
There is forward momentum but more speed is needed. The right issues are being addressed, 
but more effort is needed, with just one year left to reach the targets before the upcoming 
evaluation cycle of the Paris Declaration in 2010 and after that the moment of truth at the 
Fourth High Level Forum on Aid Effectiveness in 2011. 
 EN 25   EN 
Annex I: Member State Priority Countries (for four or more Member States) 
31
 
Mozambique BE  DK IE  FI DE  IT    NL PT   ES UK SE FR    12 
Vietnam BE CZ DK IE  FI DE    LU HU NL    ES UK  FR    12 
Palestine T BE      DE GR IT   HU NL    ES   FR  CY PL 10 
Moldova  CZ   EE   GR  LV  HU NL  RO    SE  LT  PL 10 
Afghanistan  CZ   EE  DE GR     NL    ES UK SE  LT  PL 10 
Ethiopia    IE  FI DE GR    HU NL    ES UK SE FR    10 
Tanzania BE  DK IE  FI DE      NL     UK SE FR   PL 10 
Mali BE  DK    DE    LU  NL    ES  SE FR  CY  9 
Zambia  CZ DK IE  FI DE      NL     UK SE     8 
Uganda BE  DK IE   DE      NL     UK SE FR    8 
Yemen  CZ     DE  IT   HU NL     UK  FR  CY  8 
Ukraine     EE  DE GR  LV  HU       SE  LT  PL 8 
Angola  CZ     DE  IT     PT   ES   FR   PL 7 
Georgia     EE   GR  LV   NL      SE  LT  PL 7 
DRC BE      DE      NL    ES UK SE FR    7 
Senegal BE      DE    LU  NL    ES   FR    6 
Bangladesh   DK    DE      NL    ES UK SE     6 
Bolivia BE  DK    DE      NL    ES  SE     6 
Burkina Faso   DK    DE    LU  NL      SE FR    6 
Cambodia       DE     HU     ES UK SE FR    6 
Egypt   DK    DE GR IT    NL         CY  6 
Nicaragua   DK   FI DE    LU  NL    ES       6 
Kenya   DK   FI DE      NL     UK SE FR    6 
Sudan       DE      NL    ES UK  FR    5 
Rwanda BE      DE      NL     UK  FR    5 
Iraq  CZ      GR         ES  SE  LT   5 
Bosnia-H  CZ     DE     HU NL      SE     5 
Benin BE  DK    DE      NL       FR    5 
Burundi BE      DE      NL      SE FR    5 
Cap Vert           LU  NL PT   ES   FR    5 
Ghana   DK    DE      NL     UK  FR    5 
Kosovo       DE  IT    NL      SE     5 
Niger BE      DE    LU      ES   FR    5 
Serbia  CZ     DE     HU   RO    SE     5 
Lebanon        GR IT        ES   FR  CY  5 
Morocco BE      DE  IT        ES   FR    5 
Algeria BE        IT        ES   FR    4 
Colombia       DE      NL    ES  SE     4 
FYROM            HU NL   SI   SE     4 
Guatemala       DE      NL    ES  SE     4 
Laos       DE    LU HU        FR    4 
Mauritania       DE  IT        ES   FR    4 
Mongolia  CZ     DE     HU NL           4 
Nepal   DK   FI DE           UK      4 
South-Africa BE      DE      NL       FR    4 
Belarus          LV         SE  LT  PL 4 
Ecuador BE      DE  IT        ES       4 
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 Based on the responses by Member States to the Monterrey Questionnaire: « How many countries would 
you classify as priority countries (of countries where you provided bilateral government-to-government 
ODA in 2007)? Cyprus, Poland, Malta and Slovakia reported however not to have a provided government 
to government ODA. For Ireland and Poland situation as in 2008. 
